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Abstract
This communication examines fracking (an abbreviation for hydraulic fracturing) in
Colorado, analysing the degree of alignment between problem definition, data and
evidence, political narratives, and policy interventions, among stakeholders (including
government, industry and environmental groups). The risks associated with fracking
emerged as a policy problem in 2011 following increased fracking-related complaints
in Colorado. After assessing the pattern of complaints, the government identified that
fracking concerns were driven by a ‘fear of the unknown’, propagated by environmental
groups, not by data and evidence on actual impacts. The state government intervened
by establishing three key fracking-related regulations: Rule 205A (2011) requiring
disclosure of chemicals used in the fracking process, Rule 604 (2013) extending distances
of fracking operations from building and public facilities, and Rule 609 (2013) on
stricter groundwater monitoring. At the start of the policy process, the varying
political narratives on fracking did not align with existing data and evidence. However,
after a series of deliberations between the government, industry, and environmental
groups, stakeholders in Colorado reached a common agreement on policy interventions
that eventually aligned with the basic problem definition.
Introduction and scope of study
This paper focuses on Colorado’s major policy
changes that occurred in response to fracking con-
cerns in 2011 and 2012. This analysis does not go
into the debates on fracking-induced seismicity
(or earthquakes) as it is beyond the scope of this
research [1]; instead, the focus is on environmen-
tal and health impacts. Fracking in Colorado
makes an interesting case for a policy analysis
because it is a paradigmatic example of how frack-
ing reshaped energy production in the US. Oil
production in Colorado stood at about 20-30 mil-
lion barrels per year between 1990 and 2005. But
after fracking took off in the early 2000s, Col-
orado’s production grew rapidly – reaching 177.8
million barrels in 2018 [2].
Fracking usually involves drilling an L-shaped
wellbore cased with cement and steel, typically
about two to three kilometers from the land sur-
face. When the wellbore reaches the shale re-
serves, the casing is perforated using explosive
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charges to create holes in the horizontal section
of the casing. The actual fracking then occurs
when a mixture of water (approximately 95%),
sand (3% to 4.5%) and chemicals (0.5% to 2%)
is pumped into the well under extremely high
pressure. The fluid mixture runs through the cas-
ing and exits through the perforated horizontal
sections into the shale rock. Sand particles in
the fluid help in opening the shale rocks, while
the chemicals help the oil and gas seep out back
into the well casing. The fluids initially pumped
into the well flow back out to the surface and are
disposed of or treated. Then finally, the oil and
gas is pumped back out of the well, from where
it is transported for sale [3].
Fracking has undoubtedly reshaped the US and
global energy landscape. The technique brought
about the North American ‘shale boom’ in the
early 2000s, enabling extraction of oil and gas
previously unreachable using conventional meth-
ods [4]. Having both geological and technological
advantages, the US seized the shale opportunity
to increase its domestic energy production. For
the first time since 1973, the US became a net
exporter of energy in 2018, surpassing the likes
of Saudi Arabia and Russia [5]. In reducing its
dependence on foreign oil imports, the US was
also able to strengthen both its energy security
and reduce domestic energy [6].
Despite its transformative impact, debates on the
costs and benefits of fracking in the US remain
starkly polarised, as state governments have reg-
ulated fracking in varying ways prices [7]. It is
rightly argued that fracking has deepened Amer-
ica’s reliance on fossil fuels and delayed transition
to cleaner sources of energy, especially when com-
pared to energy transition in the European Union
(EU) [6]. Citizens and environmental groups
have pressured oil-producing states, including
Colorado, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas, to imple-
ment stricter regulations on fracking [8]. Three
states – Maryland, New York, and Vermont –
went on to ban fracking [9]. But in the face of en-
vironmental push-back, fracking has continually
increased across the main oil-producing states in
the US [10].
Problem definition
In 2010, Colorado witnessed an increased num-
ber of fracking-related complaints to state and
local government authorities. The complaints
were triggered by three factors. Firstly, fracking
operations began to increasingly migrate from
sparsely populated areas towards new oil and gas
discoveries in more densely populated areas (near
parks, schools, and residential areas) around 2010
to 2011 [11]. The added visibility of oil and gas
operations in Colorado contributed to increased
complaints. Secondly, the Deepwater Horizon
spill spotlighted environmental risks of oil and
gas extraction and sparked public debate on frack-
ing in Colorado and the US at large. Third, the
release of Gasland in 2010, an anti-fracking doc-
umentary that popularised images of dangers as-
sociated with fracking,1 triggered many residents
to advocate against fracking [15]. By 2011, media
attention and public complaints on fracking in
Colorado further spiked; it became apparent that
the government needed to intervene.
The Colorado government detected a mismatch
between the problem definition (Table 1) and evi-
dence. In analysing the nature of complaints, the
government observed that residents were driven
1Gasland, an award-winning HBO documentary on fracking, provides a classic example of how storytelling
and images can influence problem definition in public policy. Gasland provided a window through which many
Americans would understand the risks associated with fracking. The documentary showcased experiences of
residents in proximity to fracking operations, by narrating health problems that the residents traced to air and
water contamination. Notably, the documentary showed that pipe borne water in some fracking communities
were contaminated with chemicals and water from taps would flame up when the host lights a match close to
the faucet [12]. It was no coincidence that policy action in Colorado and three other fracking states happened
a year after the release of Gasland. Industry associations heavily criticised Gasland as ‘wildly inaccurate
and irresponsible’ [13]. They argued that depth of oil reservoirs and water aquifers are thousands of feet
apart, separated by impermeable rocks. Geologist further explained that any linkage between groundwater and
oil would take hundreds or even millions of years to happen and is unlikely to be induced by fracking. An
interdisciplinary report by MIT showed that the very rare incidents of water contamination caused by fracking
were as a result of breach of existing regulations [14]. A rebuttal documentary called FrackNation was released
in 2013, but did not attain Gasland ’s popularity, nor did it help in re-shaping public views on fracking [15, 16].
2 Cambridge Journal of Science & Policy, Vol 1 (2020), Issue 2
Fracking in Colorado: Evidence, politics and policy change
Table 1: Problem definition on fracking in Colorado.
Problem definition Fracking is risky and potentially harmful to public health and
the environment.
Industry Groups Environmental Groups
Observed condition
The risks associated with frack-
ing are being effectively man-
aged. Incidents of pollution are
as a result of bad practice, not
because fracking is risky.
The risks associated with frack-
ing outweigh the economic ben-
efits because fracking is an in-
herently risky technique.
Desired condition
Fracking should continue (busi-
ness as usual).
Fracking should be strictly reg-
ulated or banned.
by ‘fear of the unknown’, and not by actual im-
pacts (or evidence) [17]. Indeed, the information
gap between the industry and residents was a
problem in itself. Environmental groups filled the
information gap and were instrumental in shap-
ing the debate on fracking at community level,
essentially deepening existing distrust between
communities and the oil industry [18, 19].
Data and Evidence on Causes
and Consequences
Compelling research on the impacts of fracking on
public health is only recently being documented.
Several jurisdictions that have banned fracking,
including the UK in November 2019, did so based
on a so-called ‘precautionary principle’, aiming
to avoid the potential risks of fracking altogether
[20]. However, recent epidemiologic studies from
John Hopkins University and the University of
Pennsylvania showed that rates of hospitalisation
were higher in areas with fracking activities, when
compared with non-fracking communities [21, 22].
Similar studies in Colorado US have analysed the
relationships between fracking and public health
risks, but researchers are still yet to establish
direct causal links [10, 23].
Despite the research gaps in the public health
domain, there are known dangers associated with
fracking. Out of the over 1,000 different chemi-
cals used in the fracking process, about 75% are
considered dangerous to human health [24]. The
chemicals in fracking fluids (arsenic, formalde-
hyde, lead and mercury) are known to affect the
nervous systems, cardiovascular systems, respira-
tory organs, and sensory organs (including the
skin and eyes) [25]. Companies, however, argue
that most of these chemicals only affect people
upon direct exposure, which is highly unlikely for
oil workers, and even more unlikely for residents.
Environmental groups in Colorado oppose this
view by arguing that the health risks for chemical
toxins can take decades to manifest in persons
affected and that health experts need time to
confirm the dangers of fracking on residents [23].
Unlike health impacts, data and evidence on the
environmental impacts of fracking are more read-
ily available, as summarized in Figure 1.
Water pollution There are two ways frack-
ing can potentially pollute groundwater. First,
poorly constructed wells could lead to incidents
where fracking fluids or oil and gas migrate into
groundwater. Secondly, chemicals, oil, or gas
could flow from the fracked shale rocks up into
groundwater even when wells are perfectly cased
[26]. But several geologic and hydrological studies
have shown that the second risk is highly unlikely
because shale oil and gas is well below groundwa-
ter layers and separated by rock [27]. According
to Colorado’s oil sector regulator, oil and gas com-
panies in Colorado reported 516 cases of spills or
releases between 2013 and 2017, but none of the
spillages affected public water systems [28].
Air pollution When oil and gas flow out of
wells, most of the gas (in form of methane) is cap-
tured. But there are cases where methane (which
traps more than 20 times more heat than CO2 in
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groundwater layers and separated by rock.33 According to Colorado’s oil sector regulator, oil and 
gas companies in Colorado reported 516 cases of spills or releases between 2013 and 2017, but 
none of the spillages affected public water systems.34  
Air pollution: When oil and gas flow out of wells, most of the gas (in form of methane) is 
captured. But there are cases where methane (which traps more than 20 times more heat than 
CO2 in the atmosphere) and other chemical gases such as benzene, escapes into the atmosphere 
during explosions or leak out of gas pipelines. These gases have strong greenhouse effects and 
pose health risks (such as asthma and skin disorders) upon direct or indirect exposure 
\citep{rasmussen2016association}. A 2017 study using data from Colorado’s environmental 
agency found that in 10 years, there were 116 fracking-related explosions in Colorado.36 At an 
incidence rate of one in 3,700 active wells, air pollution risks are generally low by regulatory 
standards.37  
Figure 2: Pollution risk matrix 		
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Figure 1: Pollution risk matrix.
the atmosphere) and other chemical gases such
as benzene, escapes into the atmosphere during
explosions or leak out of gas pipelines. These
gases have strong greenhouse effects and pose
health risks (such as asthma and skin disorders)
upon direct or indirect exposure [22]. A 2017
study using data from Colorado’s environmental
agency found that in 10 years, there were 116
fracking-related explosions in Colorado [29]. At
an incidence rate of one in 3,700 active wells, air
pollution risks are generally low by regulatory
standards [28].
Political Narratives
Environmental Groups When fracking be-
came a major policy issue in 2010, environmental
groups downplayed the economic gains of frack-
ing and focused on the health and environmental
risks. Their political narrative combined ‘sto-
ries of power’ with ‘stories on change’ [30]. The
‘change’ narrative depicted the negative impacts
associated with fracking, such as air pollution and
water contamination. The ‘stories of power’ por-
trayed the government and companies as conspir-
ators in environmental injustices. They argued
that the governments and companies are aware
of the risks associated with fracking, but kept it
secret to maintain economic gains [31].
Industry Groups As shown in Figure 2 be-
low, the industry groups showed low interest in
addressing environmental concerns. However, as
companies became more aware of the negative
perceptions associated with fracking, they com-
municated that with proper regulation and safety
measures, most of the risks associated with frack-
ing can be effectively mitigated [32]. Companies
explained that fracking has been used in Col-
orado for over 40 years and that the process is
engineered to ensure the safety of the environ-
ment and public health. To put the fracking pro-
cess in context, an oil company once published
that fracking occurs in depths about 10 times the
tallest building in Denver, Colorado (7,000 ft.)
[33]. Such descriptions aimed to allay fears that
fracking occurs near aquifers.
State Government At the state level, frack-
ing enjoyed bipartisan support in Colorado since
the technique become widespread in the early
2000s. Governor John Hickenlooper, a former ge-
ologist and oil worker, was Governor of Colorado
at the height of the fracking debate. The governor
was an ideal ‘man in the middle’ because he was
able to productively engage in the technical and
non-technical discourse on fracking [34]. During
Governor Hickenlooper’s time in office from 2011
to 2019, the government actively supported frack-
ing. In fact, Governor Hickenlooper went as far as
appearing on industry-sponsored advertisements
[35]. Even though Governor Hickenlooper’s pro-
fracking stance was sometimes criticised in the
media, he generally enjoyed strong public support
in Colorado, having previously served as Mayor
of Denver from 2003 to 2011 [36].
Fracking is good for the coun-
try’s energy supply, our national
security, our economy, and our
environment.
- Gov. John Hickenlooper [33]
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Local Governments The political narratives
at local government levels are remarkably differ-
ent from that of the state government. Local
governments do not have strong incentives to sup-
port fracking because they do not benefit from
corporate taxes paid by companies, but they are
left to deal with negative externalities [37]. Long-
mont and Fort Collins went on to ban fracking at
the county level in 2012 and 2013 respectively [38].
The ban brought about legal controversies that
resulted in a Colorado Supreme Court decision
to reverse fracking bans imposed by both local
authorities, and effectively limited the authority
of local governments to impose environmental
regulations that go against laws by the State of
Colorado [39].
at the county level in 2012 and 2013 respectively.47 Th  ban bro ght about legal controversies that 
resulted in a Colorado Supreme Court decision to reverse fracking bans imposed by both local 
authorities, and effectively limited the authority of local governments to impose environmental 
regulations that go against laws by the State of Colorado.48  
Figure 3: Stakeholder Map Showing Level of Interest and Influence on Fracking-Related 
Environmental Impacts  
 
 
Policy Interventions 
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externalities of oil and gas activities in Colorado since its establishment in 1951. 1  With the 
proliferation of fracking in the early 2000s, COGCC was drawn into the debate on fracking. 
COGCC approached fracking in a cautious and incremental manner, recognizing that even though 
fracking was controversial, compelling evidence on its impacts were still being researched and 
documented.  
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2007.49 These amendments introduced deliberative and collaborative rule-making procedures on 
environmental matters and allowed citizens or interested parties to file regulatory applications to 
COGCC.50 Aside from the COGCA and CHSA amendments, Colorado handled fracking as a mainly 
regulatory issue, through the COGCC ensuring that specific regulations did not go through the 
	
47 Minor, J. - Local Government Fracking Regulations: A Colorado Case Study, 2013 
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Pol cy Interventions
The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Com-
mission (COGCC) has regulated environmental
externalities of oil and gas activities in Colorado
since its establishment in 1951. With the prolifer-
ation of fracking in the early 2000s, COGCC was
drawn into the debate on fracking. COGCC ap-
proached fracking in a cautious and incremental
anner, recognizing that ev th ugh fracking
was controversial, compelling evidence on its im-
pacts were still being researched and documented.
Colorado’s policy process on fracking benefitted
from legislative amendments to the Colorado Oil
and Gas Conservation Act (COGCA) and the
Colorado Habitat Stewardship Act (CHSA) in
2007 [40]. These amendments introduced delib-
erative and collaborative rule-making procedures
on environmental matters and allowed citizens or
interested parties to file regulatory applications to
COGCC [36]. Aside from the COGCA and CHSA
amendments, Colorado handled fracking mainly
as a regulatory issue via the COGCC, ensuring
that specific regulations did not go through the
Colorado legislature [41].
Following deliberative processes between the gov-
ernment, industry groups and environmental
group, from 2010 to 2013, the COGCC estab-
lished the three main regulations in response to
fracking:
Rule 205A: Hydraulic Fracturing Chem-
ical Disclosure (2011) [42] – The regulation
requires companies to publicly disclose the types
of chemicals, concentrations of chemical additives,
and quantity of water used in fracking. The dis-
closure rule does not cover chemicals that are con-
sidered trade secrets, unless in situations where
public health experts or regulators demand such
proprietary information. Companies were man-
dated to publish the information on FracFocus.org
to ensure transparency of operations.
Rule 604: Setback and Mitigation Mea-
sures for Oil and Gas Facilities, Drilling,
and Well Servicing Operations (2013) [43]
– This regulation addressed concerns about locat-
ing oil and gas drilling operations near homes,
schools, parks, and other public facilities. Rule
604 now ensures that drilling cannot occur less
than 500 ft (152.4 metres) from any building
units, and not less than 1,000 (304.8 metres) ft
from high-occupancy buildings. Under this reg-
ulation, companies are also required to conduct
site-specific assessments prior to any drilling ac-
tivities and ensure that any risks to public health
or the environment are effectively mitigated.
Rule 609: Groundwater Baseline Sam-
pling and Monit ring (2013) [44] – This
regulation mandates testing of groundwater
for toxins at various stages of well develop-
ment. Even though Colorado already had
some localised groundwater testing rules, Rule
609 brought about a more comprehensive
groundwater-monitoring program. For baseline
water assessment, companies must collect sam-
ples of groundwater from within 800 m of the
well. Companies will then test for contamination
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within six months to one year of commencing pro-
duction, and then after 5 to 6 years to check for
short or long-term contamination of groundwater.
Conclusion
The enactment of Rules 205A, 604, and 609 were
considered victories by both the government, in-
dustry associations, and environmental groups.
Outlined below are key factors that occasioned
policy change on fracking in Colorado, and en-
sured policy alignment:
Regulatory approach The state government
wisely calculated that it would be better to find
a regulatory solution to the fracking issue else it
could become politicised. This was especially cru-
cial for Rule 205A which was passed in the run-up
to Colorado’s 2012 elections. The rationale for
finding a regulatory solution was to avoid a situa-
tion where the fracking would enter the state legis-
lature’s agenda and become politically divisive to
the detriment of evidence-based decision-making
[36].
Policy entrepreneurship Former Colorado
Governor, John Hickenlooper is considered a pol-
icy entrepreneur [45] because his political mes-
saging assured residents that with strong regula-
tion fracking was safe and economically beneficial
to the state (primarily in tax revenue and job
creation). The former governor also played an
instrumental role in building trust between the
industry and residents, by encouraging industry
groups to disclose chemicals used in the fracking
process to demonstrate beyond doubt that their
chemicals are not harmful to the environment
[34].
Policy diffusion Experiences from other oil-
producing states influenced Colorado’s rules on
fracking, in line with political theory on ‘policy
diffusion’. Policy diffusion happens when policy
choices in a given area is influenced by that of
other jurisdictions [46]. Between 2010 and 2011,
industry groups in Arkansas and Texas reached
fracking disclosure agreements with environmen-
tal groups [37]. Therefore, Colorado also benefit-
ted from the existence of disclosure models and
found ways to adapt the rules to the state’s geol-
ogy, geography, and residential characteristics.
Analysis of Colorado’s fracking policies shows
that environmental and industry groups altered
their views on fracking over time. As the pol-
icy process progressed, environmental interests
increasingly converged and stakeholders estab-
lished some common understanding to facilitate
policy change [41]. For example, the misinforma-
tion that fracking poisoned underground water
was later revised by environmental groups [36].
On the industry side, companies relaxed their
position on setbacks and chemical non-disclosure,
realizing that keeping chemical compositions as
trade secrets only worsened public perceptions
on fracking [38]. For this reason, it is plausible
to conclude that the policy interventions aligned
to a great extent with the problem definition and
available evidence on fracking.
c© 2020 The Author. Published by the Cambridge
University Science & Policy Exchange under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/,
which permits unrestricted use, provided the original
author and source are credited.
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